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The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act Amendments of
1988: "Death" of a Law
Bartley A. Brennan*
The Members of Congress who authored this elimination of the
antibribery law chose the perfect vehicle. They needed.a big bill that
would be handled by a myriad of committees so they could bury the
few fatal lines that killed the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act deep in
this forest of hundreds of thousands of words. They needed a controversial bill that would concentrate the debate on a series of economic matters that shook and divided the country and distracted the
press from the death knell to antiforeign bribery law. What an opportunity to slip through a bribery repealer. The authors of the provision fully understood the gutting provision could hot stand by
itself. Even in a moderately complex bill the amendment would be
vulnerable. But pushed by one of the many committees developing
the details of this king size trade bill that was furiously contested by
Congress and the President, the press and public could hardly be
expected to notice the death of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act.'
I. Introduction
An extraordinary eight year effort by some members of Congress and some business lobbyists to amend the Foreign Corrupt
Practices Act of 1977 (FCPA or Act) 2 culminated on August 23,
1988, with the enactment of the Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988 (Trade Act). 3 The 1988 FCPA Amendments are
* Professor of Legal Studies, Bowling Green State University, B.S.F.S. Georgetown
University School of Foreign Service, 1963; M.A. Memphis State University, 1974; J.D.
College of Law, State University of New York at Buffalo, 1968. Professor Brennan testified
before the International Economic Policy and Trade Subcommittee of the House Foreign
Affairs Committee on October 6, 1983,' with regard to proposed amendments to the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977.
1 134 CONG. REC. S 8528 (daily ed. June 24, 1988) (statement of Sen. Proxmire).
2 Pub. L. No. 95-213, 91 Stat. 1494 (1977) (codified at 15 U.S.C. §§ 78a, 78m, 78dd1, 78dd-2, 78ff (1982)).
3 Omnibus Trade and Competitiveness Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100-418, 102 Stat.
1107 (1988) (codified in scattered sections of 15 U.S.C. (1988)) [hereinafter.Trade Act].
For a discussion of previous efforts to amend the 1977 Act, see H.R. 2157, 99th Cong., 2d
Sess. (1985) and S.2033,- 100th Cong., 2d Sess. (1986). See also Brock, ProgressReport on
Efforts to Amend the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act, 4 DET. C.L. REV. 1083 (1983); Brennan,
Amending the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: "Clarifying" or "Gutting" a Law?, I1 J.
LEGIS. 56, 57 (1984); Longobardi, Reviewing the Situation: What isto be Done With the.Foreign
Corrupt PracticesAct?, 20 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 431,449-61 (1987); Roberts, Revision of the
Foreign CorruptPracticesAct by the 1988 Omnibus Trade Bill: Will it Reduce the ComplianceBurdens
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only six pages in this approximately four hundred page piece of legislation whose goals only indirectly, at best, were to amend the
FCPA.4 Those seeking to amend the FCPA had, over an eight-year
period, failed to obtain passage of such amendments when they were
introduced as separate bills. 5 Furthermore, the Trade Act itself was
once vetoed by the President and was passed as a result of a series of
compromises worked out in a Trade Bill Conference Committee. 6 It
is therefore not surprising that proponents of the FCPA, such as Senator Proxmire, have charged those who have been successful in
amending the Act with seeking to "gut" the law.
This Article analyzes the major changes that the 1988 Amendments made to the accounting and antibribery sections of the 1977
FCPA. 'Throughout the discussion particular attention will be given
to the way in which the 1988 Amendments address the problems created by the 1977 Act. These problems are identified in a 1981 report
issued by the General Accounting Office, which conducted a survey
of U.S. corporations. 7 This Article concludes that the 1988 Amendments severely undercut the original objectives of the 1977 Act.
In reviewing the 1988 Amendments to the FCPA, it should be
remembered why the 1977 Act was enacted. In the period from
1974 to 1976, approximately 435 corporations voluntarily disclosed
to the Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) that they had
made improper or questionable payments to foreign officials or
members of foreign political parties. 8 Such bribery led to the downand Anticompetitive Impact?, 1989 B.Y.U.L. REV. 491; 15 U.S.C. §§ 78m(b), 78dd-2, 78tt
(1982 & Supp. IV 1986).
4 The stated goals of the Trade Act are to:
(1) authorize the negotiation of reciprocal trade agreements;
(2) strengthen United States trade laws;
(3) improve the development and management of United States trade
strategy; and
(4) through these actions, improve standards of living in the world.
Trade Act § 1001(b), supra note 3, at 1120.
5 See sources cited supra note 3.
6 Following modification in the conference committee, Congress passed H.R. 3. 134
CONG. REC. H 2363, 2375 (daily ed. Apr. 21, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. S 4926-27 (daily ed.
Apr. 27, 1988). However, the President vetoed it because of its perceived protectionist
tone. 134 CONG. REC. H 3531 (daily ed. May 14, 1988). The House voted to override the
veto, 134 CONG. REC. H 3552 (daily ed. May 24, 1988), but the Senate sustained the veto.
134 CONG. REC. S 7385 (daily ed. June 8, 1988). The Congress then passed H.R. 4848
which, with the deletion of two provisions, was the same as H.R. 3. 134 CONG. REC. H
5694 (daily ed. July 13, 1988); 134 CONG. REC. S 10731 (daily ed. Aug. 3, 1988). The
Conference Report which contains the compromises was part of H.R. 3, as originally introduced, and was adopted by the committee members as the legislative history of the
Amendments. H.R. CONF. REP. No. 576, 100th Cong., 2d Sess., 134 CONG. REC. H 1863,
H 2116 (daily ed. Apr. 20, 1988), reprinted in 1988 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEWS 1949
[hereinafter CONFERENCE REPORT].
7 U.S. GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE, REPORT TO THE CONGRESS: IMPACT OF FOREIGN

CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT ON U.S. BUSINESS (Mar. 4, 1981) [hereinafter GAO REPORT].
8 See SECURITIES AND EXCHANGE COMMISSION,

REPORT TO THE SENATE COMM.

ON

BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN AFFAIRS, 94TH CONG., 2D SESS., QUESTIONABLE AND ILLEGAL CORPORATE PAYMENTS AND PRACTICES (Comm. Print 1976) [hereinafter SEC REPORT].

1990]

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

fall of governments and officials in Japan, the Netherlands, and Korea. 9 By weakening its statute against bribery, the United States does
not present itself as a good political and economic model for other
nations to follow. This message is especially inappropiate at a time
when the Soviet Union and several Eastern European nations are
evolving toward economies based on the U.S. model.
II. The Accounting Provisions of the FCPA
A. The 1977 Accounting Provisions
The accounting section of the 1977 Act amended section 13(b)
of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934 (Exchange Act)' 0 and attempted to prevent bribery of foreign officials by requiring U.S. corporations to establish accounting control systems."I Specifically, the
1977 accounting control provisions required every issuer of registered securities 12 to maintain internal controls sufficient to provide
"reasonable assurances" that certain objectives would be met. 13
Willful violation of these provisions by registrants or any person involved in the direction or management of a corporation was punishable under the Exchange Act.1 4 Punishment could include a fine of
up to $10,000 and/or imprisonment for up to five years, or a Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) civil enforcement action. 15
The SEC jointly administers the FCPA with the Department of Justice. The SEC also has the power to recommend criminal prosecution or to bring a civil action.
9 BUSINESS ACCOUNTING AND FOREIGN TRADE SIMPLIFICATION ACT: JOINT HEARINGS
ON S. 708 BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON SECURITIES AND THE SUBCOMM. ON INTERNATIONAL
FINANCE AND MONETARY POLICY OF THE SENATE COMM. ON BANKING, HOUSING, AND URBAN
AFFAIRS, 97th Cong., 1st Sess. 3 (1981) [hereinafterJOINT SENATE HEARINGS ] .

10 15 U.S.C. § 78a (1982).
I IId. § 78m(b)(2)(B).

12 Securities are registered pursuant to 15 U.S.C. § 78(1) (1988).
13 Section 102 of the 1977 Act provided that:
Every issuer... shall(A) make and keep books, records, and accounts, which, in reasonable

detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the
assets of the issuer; and
(B) devise and maintain a system of internal accounting controls sufficient to provide reasonable assurances that(i) transactions are executed in accordance with management's general or specific authorization;
(ii) transactions are recorded as necessary (I) to permit preparation
of financial statements in conformity with generally accepted accounting
principles or any other criteria applicable to such statements, and (II) to

maintain accountability for assets;
(iii) access to assets is permitted only in accordance with management's general or specific authorization; and
(iv) the recorded accountability for assets is compared with the existing assets at reasonable intervals and appropriate action is taken with respect to any differences.

15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(2) (1982).
14 Id. § 78ff(a).
15 Id.
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The major criticisms of the accounting provisions of the 1977
FCPA fell into three categories: (1) the cost of compliance due to the
vagueness of the standards delineated in the record keeping and disclosure section; (2) the lack of a materiality standard as to what must
be disclosed;, and '(3) criminal penalties for failure to meet record
keeping and accounting control.provisions.' 6 In order to determine
the validity of these criticisms, Congress requested that the General
Accounting Office (GAO) undertake a study of corporations subject
to the FCPA. 7 Over.half of the companies that responded to the
survey noted that the cost of complying with the FCPA outweighed
8
the benefits received.'
B.

The 1988 Amedments to the Accounting Provisions

The 1988 Amendments make three basic changes to the accounting section. First, the Amendments attempt to clarify the standard by which violations of the accounting provision of the FCPA can
be prosecuted. Critics had complained 19 about the imposition of
criminal penalties for technical or insignificant errors. 20 The SEC
had previously stated that it would recommend criminal prosecution
"only in the most serious and egregious cases." 2 1 -However, because
of the discretionary and often subjective nature of such recommen22
dations, the business community argued for decriminalization.
The Amendments attempt to clarify this uncertainty by restricting
criminal liability to situations where a corporation knowingly circumvents or fails to implement a system of controls.2 3 Thus, this change
codifies the existing SEC policy that criminal prosecutions will not
take place for mere negligence or for technical violations.
Second, the Amendments address the situation where a U.S.
16 See generally Brennan, supra note 3.
17 SEE GAO REPORT, supra note 7.

18 Id. at 58. In response to the question regarding the extent to which this nonbenefit/cost increased the overall cost of accounting, 27.81 chose "little or no extent,"
49.5% chose "some extent," 13.4% chose a "moderate extent," 4.1% chose a "great extent," and 5.2% chose a "very great extent." Id. at 58-59. SEE JOINT SENATE HEARINGS,
supra note 9, at 166 (statement of Mr. John Subak, Group Vice Pres. and Gen. Counsel,
Rohn and Haar Co.); but cf. id. at 452 (statement ofJohn C. Burton, Professor of Accounting and Finance, Graduate School of Business, Columbia Univ.); see also FOREIGN CORRUPT
PRACTICES ACT--OvERSIGHT: HEARINGS BEFORE THE SUBCOMM. ON TELECOMMUNICATIONS,
CONSUMER PROTECTION, AND FINANCE OF THE COMM. ON ENERGY AND COMMERCE, HOUSE OF
REPRESENTATIVES, 97th Cong. 1st & 2d Sess. 176 (1981 & 1982) [hereinafter HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS] (statement of SEC Chairman Shad) (discussing whether these costs
are front end costs or continuing costs due to the degree of detail required by "the reason-

able detail standard").
19 SEC's Enforcer Runs Tight Ship, But Critics Charge He's Too Soft, Wall St. J., June 3,
1982, at 19, col. 2.
20 GAO REPORT, Suprd note 7, at 31-33.
21 Id. at 71.
22 See JOINT SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 9,.at 141 (statement of R. McNeil).

23 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(4), (5) (1988).
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corporation would be held liable for the failure of its minority-owned
subsidiary to adhere to the accounting requirements. The 1988
Amendments now provide that in the event a U.S.-based multinational owns fifty percent or less of a foreign firm, the former discharges its responsibility under the accounting provision if it uses its
influence in "good faith to the extent reasonable under the circumstances" to cause the foreign firm to maintain an accounting system
which meets the requirements of the FCPA.24 Such circumstances
include the degree of ownership and the laws and practices of the
country in which the foreign firm is located. 25 A showing of "good
faith" creates a presumption that the U.S. corporation has met the
1977 Act's requirement of keeping records in "reasonable detail,"
and of providing "reasonable assurances" that the transaction was
26
recorded.
Third, the Amendments seek to clarify further the terms "reasonable detail" and "reasonable assurances." The 1977 FCPA record keeping provision 2 7 required every company, registered under
the Exchange Act, whether or not it did business internationally, to
maintain a system of accounting controls "to provide reasonable assurance" that transactions were made in the proper manner. 28 Also,
the Act required every company to keep records "which, in reasonable detail, accurately and fairly reflect the transactions and dispositions of the assets of the issuer."'29 The 1988 Amendments define
these two terms to mean that "level of detail and degree of assurance
as would satisfy prudent officials in the conduct. of their own affairs." 3 0° The Conference Report states that the concept of "reasonableness of necessity" contemplates the weighing of a number of
relevant factors, including the cost of compliance. 3 ' It should be
noted the Conference Report expresses concern that a cost-benefit
standard could weaken the accounting controls systems now in
32
place.
C. Policy Implications
Despite the above three changes, the 1988 Amendments fail to
provide adequate guidelines because they do not include a "materiality" standard familiar to accountants and securities lawyers. 33 The
24 Id. § 78m(b)(6).
25 Id.
26 Id.

27 15 U.S.C. § 78m (1982).
28

Id. § 78m(b)(2)(B).

29 Id. § 78m(b)(2)(A).
30 15 U.S.C. § 78m(b)(7) (1988).
Si See CONFERENCE REPORT supra note 6, at H 2116.
32 Id.
33 "Materiality" includes all information which is significant to the decision of poten-

tial investors as to whether they will or will not invest in a stock. Such information in-
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lack of a materiality standard regarding what must be disclosed
under the 1977 FCPA led to confusion in the business and legal
communities. The American Bar Association Committee on Corporate Law and Accounting concluded that, based on the legislative
history of the FCPA, a "materiality standard" existed.3 4 The SEC,
however, concluded that Congress intended that a "reasonableness
standard" should be used in reviewing cases brought under the
FCPA.3 5 The GAO, on the other hand, recommended that a "materiality standard" not be adopted by Congress.3 6 The GAO concluded that the adoption of such a standard would weaken the intent
of the accounting provisions of the FCPA.3 7 It argued that while
"materiality" is geared to disclosure for investors, it is not appropriate for assessing the adequacy of internal accounting.3 8 The GAO
pointed out that the FCPA seeks to provide disclosure not for the
39
purpose of investor knowledge but to prevent bribery.
The prudent person standard, however, opens up the accounting section of the FCPA to a series of questions because the level of
detail and assurance needed to "satisfy prudent officials in the conduct of their own affairs" is unclear. Does a "prudent official" standard clarify the "reasonable assurances" and "reasonable detail"
language that it was intended to clarify? How "prudent" does one
need to be? When should the "prudent official" learn of prohibited
payments-before or after they are made? In the event that knowledge comes to the official after the fact, what action should be taken,
as at that point there is a violation of both the accounting and antibribery sections of the FCPA?
Also, it might be argued that a "prudent official" standard raises
the level of awareness that is required of corporate officials, as opposed to a "reasonableness" standard. 40 The question for individual
corporate officers, companies, and the courts is whether this standard represents a stricter approach than the "reasonableness" stancludes information affecting the "managerial integrity" of the corporation. See Weisberg
v. Coastal States Gas Corp., 609 F.2d 650 (2d Cir. 1979), cert. denied, 445 U.S. 1951 (1980).
34 GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 19, 25-26.

35 id. at 19, 26-27.
36 Id. at 28.
37 Id. at 30.

38 Id. at 28, 30.
39 Id.
40 The "prudent man" test is most often used by states as an investment standard
which a trustee must strictly follow as part of a fiduciary responsibility. For example,
under New York's "prudent man rule," a trustee must employ such diligence and such
prudence in the care and management of funds, as general prudent men of discretion
employ in their own like affairs. Withers v. Teachers' Retirement Sys. New York, 447 F.
Supp. 1248, 1254 (S.D.N.Y. 1978). See also Employee Retirement Income Security Program, 29 U.S.C. § 1104(a)(1) (1982) (defining the "prudent man standard of care" as a
fiduciary acting "with the care, skill, prudence, and diligence under the circumstance then
prevailing that a prudent man acting in a like capacity and familiar with such matters would
use in the conduct of an enterprise of a like character and with like aims").
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dard set out in the FCPA prior to its amendment. Although the 1988
Amendments sought to clarify the accounting section, it appears that
they only created more confusion.
III.

The Antibribery Provisions of the FCPA
A.

The 1977 Antibribery Provisions

In addition to the accounting provisions of the 1977 FCPA
which mandated disclosure of questionable or illegal payments, Congress also provided antibribery provisions which prohibited the bribery of any foreign official. 4 ' Under this section, not all payments
were prohibited. Instead, only those payments that were driven by
corrupt intentions, those made to influence certain persons to commit or fail to perform certain acts, and those made for the purpose of
42
retaining business were prohibited.
Corporate and government officials, as well as academicians and
lawyers, criticized the bribery sections of the 1977 FCPA for vaguely
defining what constituted compliance. 4 3 Some commentators suggested that this vagueness forced U.S. corporations to forego business opportunities abroad for fear of violating the FCPA and
incurring its stiff criminal sanctions. 4 4 The GAO Report found that
of "the 30% of our respondents who reported that the Act had
caused a decrease in their overseas business, approximately 70%
rated the clarity of at least one of the anti-bribery provisions as inadequate or very inadequate." 45 The major ambiguities to the antibribery provisions noted by the respondents FCPA were the
following:
41 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-I (1982). The antibribery section of the FCPA applies to the
following: (1) issuers "of domestic concerns;" (2) officers; (3) directors; (4) employees;
(5) agents; and (6) some stockholders of issuers of domestic concerns. Id. § 78dd-2(c). All
"domestic concerns" included both SEC registrants and nonregistrants. Id. § 78dd2(d)(l).
42 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(a) (1982) provided that:
It shall be unlawful for any issuer ....officer, director, employee, or agent of
such issuer or any stockholder thereof acting on behalf of such issuer, to
make use of the mails or any means or instrumentality of interstate commerce corruptly in furtherance of an offer, payment, promise to pay, or authorization of the payment of any money, or offer, gift, promise to give, or
authorization of the giving of anything of value.
In passing the FCPA, Congress sought to obtain the "broadest" possible application of the
Act to international business by incorporating the language of the domestic mail fraud
statute. See 18 U.S.C. § 1341 (1988). The United States Supreme Court has interpreted
this statute liberally, stating that it must be sufficiently flexible to reach "new" fraud not
yet identified. See United States v. Maze, 414 U.S. 395, 405-06 (1974).
43 See generally JOINT SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 9. See also H. WEISBERG & E.
REICHENBERG, THE PRICE OF AMBIGUITY 13 (1981).
44 WEISBERG & REICHENBERG, supra note 43, at 13.
45 SEE GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 38, 59. It should be noted that 67.7% of the

respondents stated that the FCPA had little or no impact on business. None of the respondents were of the opinion that the FCPA had a positive impact on their business.
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(1) the degree of responsibility a company has for the actions of
the foreign agents;
(2) the definition of the term "foreign official";
(3) whether a payment is a bribe (illegal under the FCPA) or a
"facilitating payment" (legal under the FCPA); and
(4) 4 the
dual jurisdiction of the SEC and Department of
6
Justice.

B.

The 1988 Amendments to the Antibribery Provisions

The 1988 Amendments change the antibribery provisions of the
1977 FCPA in seven areas.
1.

Corrupt Payments

The 1988 Amendments attempt to clarify the definition of what
type of payments are prohibited. The Amendments change this definition in two respects. First, payments under the 1977 FCPA were
prohibited if their purpose was to influence "any act or decision of such
foreign official in his official capacity, including a decision to fail to perform his
officialfunctions."' 4 7 The 1988 Amendments alter this provision to forbid payments or offers to pay foreign officials for the purpose of "influencing any act or decision of such foreign official in his official capacity, or
inducing such foreign official to do or omit to do any act in violation of the
lawful duty of such official."'4 8 Thus, it would seem at first glance that
the language was changed in order to bring the FCPA into compliance with U.S. bribery laws. 49 However, as one commentator has
noted, the conferees failed because our domestic bribery statute forbids all corrupt payments intended to influence official functions,
while the FCPA, as amended, increases the number of already ex50
isting categories of facilitating or "grease" payments.
Second, under the 1977 FCPA, payments were only illegal if
made "in order to assist such issuer in obtaining or retaining business .... ..51 Some confusion arose as to whether lobbying fell
within the definition of "retaining business." Although the Conference Committee rejected a proposed amendment that would have
broadened the definition of "retaining business," the Conference
Report does attempt to clarify the provision. It states that the
conferees:
wish to make clear that the reference to corrupt payments for "retaining business" in present law is not limited to the renewal of con46
47
48
49
50

Id. at 38.
15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(a)(1)(A) (1982) (emphasis added).
Id. § 78dd-l(a)(l)(A)(i) (1988) (emphasis added).
See 18 U.S.C. § 201(b)(1)(C) (1988).
See infra note 70 and accompanying text. See also Bliss & Spak, The Foreign Corrupt

Practices Act of 1988: Clarification or Evisceration?, 20 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 441, 455 n.77

(1989).
51 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(a) (1982).

1990]

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

237

tracts or other business, but also included a prohibition against
corrupt payments relating to the execution or performance of contracts or the carrying out of existing business, such as a payment to a

foreign official for the purpose of obtaining more favorable tax
treatment. . . .The term should not, however, be construed so
broadly as to include5 2lobbying or other normal representations to
government officials.
The Conference Report as noted here sought on one hand to
broaden the scope of prohibited payments beyond the purpose of
"retaining business" but also to liberalize its interpretation so as not
to include lobbying or normal representations. These conflicting
objectives may have unfortunate repercussions in light of the expansion of categories of lawfully permitted facilitating or "grease" payments discussed below.
2.

The "Reason to Know" Standardfor Third Party Payments

In addition to prohibiting payments directly to "foreign officials," the 1977 FCPA also prohibited corporate entities or officers
from giving anything of value to "any person, while knowing or having reason to know that all or a portion of such money or thing of
53
value will be offered directly or indirectly" to various persons.
These payments are referred to as third party payments.
Almost fifty percent of the respondents surveyed by the GAO
found the "reason to know" language either "very inadequate" or
"marginally inadequate."15 4 Lawyers and legal scholars argued that a
"reason to know" standard increased the potential liability of a company and its officers for the acts of foreign agents or more closely
affiliated third parties even if the company was unable to monitor or
control their conduct. Several recurring questions were asked.
What does "reason to know" mean? Is "reason to know" something
less than full actual knowledge? If so, how much less, and should it
be used in prosecution of criminal conduct? 55 Those favoring the
language as it stood under the FCPA pointed out that "reason to
know" language existed in twenty-nine provisions of other federal
laws. 56 An analysis of these provisions, however, showed that thirteen of the twenty-nine provisions were civil or administrative statutes as contrasted with the FCPA, a criminal statute that provided for
up to five years imprisonment. 5 7 The remaining provisions fell into
areas relating to federal safety standards or other types of regulatory
procedures. Furthermore, similar "reason to know" language is in52 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 918.
53 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(a)(3), 78dd-2(a)(3) (1982).
54 GAO REPORT, supra note 7, at 60.

55 See Hibey, The PracticalNecessity for,Amendment of the Foreign Corrupt Practices Act: S.
708-The Current Legislative Initiative, 10 HOFSTRA L. REV. 1121 (1982).
56 SEE JOINT SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 416 (statement of W. Dobrovir).
57 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c) (1982).
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cluded in eight provisions of the criminal code which has been re58
placed by the Federal Criminal Code Revisions.
Perhaps the most significant problem was that no precedents existed interpreting the "reason to know" language of the 1977 FCPA.
In addition, because both the Department ofJustice and the SEC had
joint enforcement authority, a question was raised as to whether the
agencies had the same interpretation of the "reason to know"
language. 5 9
The 1988 Amendments delete the "reason to know" language

and apply a "knowing" standard, which is defined as follows:
(A) A person's state of mind is "knowing" with respect to conduct, a circumstance, or a result if(i) such person is aware that such person is engaging in
such conduct, that such circumstance exists, or that such result is
substantially certain to occur; or
(ii) such person has a firm belief that such circumstance exists or that such result is substantially certain to occur.
(B) When knowledge of the existence of a particular circumstance is required for an offense, such knowledge is established if a
person is aware of a high probability of the existence of such circumstance, unless 60
the person actually believes that such circumstance
does not exist.

This standard is the result of a compromise in the Trade Bill
Conference Committee (Committee). The House version defined
"knowing" for criminal liability as being "aware or substantially certain" or "consciously disregarding a high probability" that a payment would be made for prohibited purposes. 6 ' Civil liability would
have applied under the House version if the corporation had actual
58 See Fedders, The "Reason to Know" Standard-A Troublesome Ambiguity in the U.S. Foreign CorruptPracticesAct, 4 MIDDLE EAST EXECUTIVE REP. 2, 20 & n.14 (July, 1981) listing the
provisions; and R. BECKLER, A. LEVENSON & R. SHINE, THE NEW REVIEW PROCEDURE
UNDER THE FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT 11 105-08 (1980) listing and describing the
provisions.
59 A related concern stemmed from parallel investigations, wherein the Department
of Justice was pursuing a criminal investigation before an impaneled grand jury and the
SEC staff was conducting a civil investigation. Should corporate counsel advise their clients to remain silent pursuant to the fifth amendment and prevent the SEC from engaging
in document discovery because of the possible implications in a criminal proceeding? U.S.
CONST. amend. V. In doing so, would a client be biased in a civil proceeding? In one case,
the court held that parallel investigations by the SEC and Department of Justice may be
conducted as long as they are independent and legally authorized. SEC v. Dresser Inds.,
Inc., 628 F.2d 1368, 1377 (D.C. Cir.) (en banc), cert. denied, 449 U.S. 993 (1980). See
generally Hibey, supra note 55, for an analysis of these issues. Wallace L. Timmeny, former Deputy Director of the SEC Division of Enforcement, promotes the theory that doing
business in certain unspecified foreign countries where corruption was known to be commonplace would constitute a "red flag" warning that any payment to a local agent might
involve a bribe and, thereby, require that a U.S. entity conduct a far-reaching investigation
prior to engaging the agent in order to avoid a charge of negligent, or even reckless,
violation of the FCPA. See Timmeny, SEC Enforcement of the Foreign Corrupt PracticesAct, 2
Loy. L.A. INT'L & COMP. L. ANN. 25 (1979).
60 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(f)(2)(A), (B) (1988).
61 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 919.

1990]

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

239

knowledge of its agent's bribe or if the corporation recklessly disregarded the "substantial risk" that a bribe would be made. 6 2 This
dual standard for criminal and civil liability was criticized by the business community for fear of possible vicarious liability and potential
substantial civil fines. 6 3 The House then added a due diligence defense to meet this criticism. As noted above, the House and Senate
versions dealing with third party liability were resolved in the Conference Committee with a "knowing" standard being adopted for
criminal liability, the dropping of civil liability for recklessly disregarding that an agent would pay a bribe, and the deletion of the due
diligence defense.
The "reason to know" standard has been replaced by a standard
that is more difficult for prosecutors to meet. The Conference Report made it clear that "simple negligence" or "mere foolishness"
was insufficient for criminal liability.r 4 However, the Committee also
stated that management will be held liable for "conscious disregard," "willful blindness," or "deliberate ignorance." 6 5 In other
words a "head in the sand" state of mind approach by management
will not be tolerated. Citing several federal cases the Conference Report noted that the knowledge requirement is not equivalent to recklessness. It requires "an awareness of a high probability of the
existence of the circumstance." '6 6 The Conference Report goes on
to state that the FCPA covers circumstances where any "reasonable
person would have realized the existence of the circumstance or result" and the defendant "consciously chose not to ask about what he
had reason to believe he would discover." 67 Courts are instructed to
use a mix of subjective and objective standards to determine the
level of knowledge based on this test.6 8
It would appear that the only circumstance from which a company must now protect itself is the intentional disregarding of some
mix of subjective and objective signals that illegal payments were
made by an agent or employee to a third party. It is not clear at this
point what the signals are. As one commentator has pointed out, the
Conference Report does not cite any cases which "suggest liability
where the consequences of the factual knowledge possessed by the
defendant result in future conduct prohibited by the statute,"'69 yet
the language of the statute imposes liability in cases where there is an
62 Id.

63 See 134 CONG. REC. S 2589 (daily ed. Mar. 18, 1988) (Statement of California
Trade Commission).
64 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 919-20.
65 Id.

66 Id. (quoting United States v. Jacobs, 475 F.2d 270, 287 n.37 (2d Cir. 1973)),
67 Id. (quoting United States v. Picciandra, 788 F.2d 39, 46 (1st Cir. 1986)).
68 Id.
69 See Hill, Foreign Representatives: Saudi Law and the FCPA, Foreign CorruptPrac. Act Rep.,

(Bus. L., Inc.) 200.0101, 200.0127 (Apr., 1989).

N.CJ. INT'L L. & COM. REG.

240

[VOL. 15

awareness or belief "such result is substantially certain to occur."'70
It would seem clear that the language substituted for the "reason to
know" standard may in fact prevent serious prosecution of violators
of the FCPA.
3.

FacilitatingPayments

The Amendments change the exemption for facilitating or
"grease" payments. These payments are not made to obtain or retain business but merely to expedite a business activity in which the
ministerial level employee is already employed. An example is the
payment of thirty dollars to a customs official to move paperwork
along so that a shipment of nondurable goods can be unloaded
quickly. Many foreign governments permit such facilitating payments even though they are illegal in the United States and several
71
other countries.
Under the 1977 FCPA, facilitating payments were allowed in
several ways. The 1977 FCPA defined "foreign official" as any officer or employee of a foreign government or one of its departments,
agencies, or instrumentalities. 7 2 This definition expressly excluded
any employee whose duties were "essentially ministerial or clerical." 7 3 Corporate officials frequently complained that this language
was unclear. Are employees of a publicly held nationalized corporation considered "foreign officials?" Is an official, or member of that
official's family residing in a foreign country, who is also involved in
the private sector a"'foreign official?" How should the law treat individuals who simultaneously hold positions in both government and
business? Can an excluded "ministerial or clerical" employee be
paid a "facilitating payment" to use his influence to induce a "foreign official" to act, as long as the clerical employee does not pay the
official from funds received from a U.S. corporation?
As stated above, the 1977 FCPA also proscribed only "corrupt"
payments. The legislative history of the FCPA defined a corrupt payment as one made "to induce the recipient to misuse his official position in order to wrongfully direct business to the payor or his client"
and requires an "evil motive or purpose."'74 Because ministerial employees were excluded from the definition of foreign official, it is
clear the FCPA was not intended to proscribe grease or facilitating
payments. 75 Moreover, social gifts or routine expenditures for marketing products were lawful. However, consistent complaints about
70 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(t)(2)(A)(i) (1988).
71 See Comment, The Foreign Corrupt Practices Act of 1977: A Solution or a Problem?, 11
CAL. W. INT'L L.J. 111, 131 (1981).
72 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(d) (1982).

73 Id. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(d)(2).
74 H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 8 (1977).
75 S. REP. No. 114, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 10, reprinted in 1977 U.S. CODE CONG. &
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enforcement officials' interpretation led to requests for a congres76
sional clarification of the statute.
Despite the apparently clear legislative intent that facilitating
payments to ministerial or clerical employees not be proscribed,
thirty-eight percent of those responding to the GAO questionnaire
rated the clarity of the provisions inadequate.7 7 The dilemma raised
was that a large corrupt payment to an official with "ministerial" duties might not be prohibited while a small payment to expedite cus78
toms papers may be prohibited if made to a senior "official."
Furthermore, middle-level employees of U.S. corporations did not
fully understand what constituted a facilitating payment. The decision to make such a payment would often have to be made quickly
because hesitation might cause a delay in transportation or unloading of goods.
The 1988 Amendments now allow payments to any foreign official if they are facilitating or expediting payments for the purposes of
expediting or securing the performance of a routine governmental
action. 79 "Routine governmental action" is defined as follows:
an action which is ordinarily and commonly performed by a foreign
official in:
(i) obtaining permit[s], licenses, or other official documents to
qualify a person to do business in a foreign country;
(ii) processing governmental papers such as visas and work
order[s];
(iii) providing police protection, mail pick up and delivery, or
scheduling inspections associated with contract performance or inspections related to transit of goods across country;

(iv) providing phone service, power and water supply, loading
and unloading cargo, or protecting perishable products or commodities from deterioration; or
80
(v) actions of a similar nature.

Payments can now be made to any foreign official, not just ministerial or clerical persons, as long as they fall within the five categoADMIN. NEWS 4098, 4108. The Report of the Senate Banking, Housing, and Urban Affairs

Committee stated that:
The statute covers payments made to foreign officials for the purpose of obtaining business or influencing legislation or regulations. The statute does
not, therefore, cover so-called "grease payments" such as payments for expediting shipments through customs or placing a transatlantic telephone call,
securing required permits, or obtaining adequate police protection, transactions which may involve even the proper performance of duties.
1977 U.S. CODE CONG. & ADMIN. NEws at 4108.

For a discussion of the importance of the corrupt intent requirement, see Elden &
Sableman, Negligence Is Not Corruption: The Scienter Requirement of the Foreign-CorruptPractices
Act, 49 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 819 (1980-81).
76 See JOINT SENATE HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 154 (statement of R. McNeil); id. at
265 (statement of M. Feldman).
77 GAO REPORTi, supra note 7, at 60.

78 Id. at 41.

79 15 U.S.C. §§ 78dd-l(b), 78dd-2(b) (1988).
80 Id. § 78dd-l(f)(3)(A).
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ries. This substantially changes the intent of the 1977 FCPA as well
as the breadth of the exception. The 1977 FCPA facilitating payments language was directed at the type of foreign official (ministerial or clerical), while 1988 amendments are directed at the type of
duties to be performed. The "actions of a similar nature" language
greatly expands the types of activities that may be allowed as
"grease" or facilitating payments.
4.

Affirmative Defenses

In addition to expanding the "grease" payment exceptions for
criminal prosecution, the 1988 Amendments also provide for two affirmative defenses for those accused of violating the FCPA. First, it
is now an affirmative defense if a payment to a foreign official is lawful "under the written laws" of the foreign country. 8 ' The Conference Report makes it clear "that the absence of written laws in a
foreign official's country would not by itself be sufficient to satisfy
this defense." 8 2 Also, in interpreting what is lawful under written
law, the conference committee members state that "normal rules of
83
legal construction should apply."
This defense was added in response to complaints that U.S.
companies were losing business because actions forbidden by the
1977 FCPA were permitted in foreign countries and undertaken by
foreign competitors.8 4 A related problem was the lack of uniformity
among nations regarding the propriety of facilitating payments.8 5
While a foreign agent might legally receive such a payment under the
law of his or her country, the U.S. corporation making the payment
might be violating the FCPA.
A study by Dr. John Graham of the University of Southern California, which reviewed all available empirical data, concluded that:
(a) During the 1978-1980 period, the FCPA had no negative effect on export performance of American industry. No differences in
U.S. markets shown were discovered in nations where the FCPA was

reported to be a trade disincentive both in terms of total trade with
each country as well as for sales in individual product categories.
(b) During the 1977 statute, U.S. trade with bribe-prone countries has actually outpaced our trade with non-bribe-prone ones. 86
Dr. Graham further concluded that the FCPA has not hurt the competitive position of U.S. industry. In fact, Dr. Graham's study provides support for the proposition that improper foreign payments
81 Id. § 78dd-l(c)(1).
82 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 922.
83 Id. at 921-22.
84 See H. WEISBERG & E. REICHENBERG, supra note 43, at 13.
85 See Comment, supra note 70, at 129-31, for a list of countries which prohibit facilitating payments, including France, Switzerland, Jordan, El Salvador, and Saudi Arabia.
86 Graham, Foreign Corrupt Practices: A Manager's Guide, 18 COLUM. J. WORLD Bus. 89

(1983).
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are at least unnecessary. He suggests, therefore, that management
should question payments
to foreign firms on economic as well as
8 7
ethical grounds.
Another complaint was that the FCPA sought to export U.S. morality. However, David D. Newsome has argued that the corrupt association of a U.S. company and a foreign official carries political
implications for both actors which do not concern other foreign multinational corporations. He notes that "American businessmen often
ask, 'Why us?' Why should America's multinationals be singled out
for restrictions when all around them their competitors operate without such restrictions?" 8 8 Mr. Newsome concludes that the answer
lies in the unique position which U.S. corporations have in world
business ventures, coupled with their role in domestic affairs of foreign nations. 8 9 He states that "[olur companies cannot escape the
fact that their activities will never be totally detached from local sensitivities relating to United States intervention of any sort in the internal affairs of another country." 90 Thus, from both an economic
and a moral viewpoint, this new affirmative defense seems unnecessary and unwise.
The second affirmative defense established by the Amendments
allows payments to be made for "reasonable and bona fide expenditures." 9 1 Examples include travel and lodging expenses incurred by
or on behalf of a foreign official, party, party official, or candidate
that are "directly related to (A) the promotion, demonstration or explanation of products or services; or (B) the execution or perform9 2
ance of a contract with a foreign government or agency thereof."
In general, this second affirmative defense codifies the procedure
93
followed by the Justice Department under the 1977 FCPA.
5.

Repeal of the "Eckhardt Amendment"

The "Eckhardt Amendment," which was included in the 1977
Act, prevented the prosecution of employees or agents of an issuer
or U.S. corporation unless the concern itself was found to have violated the FCPA. 94 The 1988 Amendments delete the language that
95
prevented such prosecution.
Congressman Eckhardt originally proposed such language to
prevent senior management of companies from using agents or em87 Id.
88 See HOUSE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARINGS, supra note 18, at 391
Newsome).
89 Id.

90 See id. at 391-92.
91 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-1(c)(2) (1988).
92 Id.

93 See 28 C.F.R. § 50.18 (1985).
94 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-2(b)(3) (1982).

95 CONFERENCE REPORT, supra note 6, at 919-20.

(statement of D.
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ployees as "scapegoats." Also, the legislative history indicates that
the sponsors of the 1977 Act were concerned that agents or employees might not have the resources to defend themselves against
charges of violations of the FCPA. 9 6 The 1988 Amendments now
open the door for the "scapegoat" scenario. Therefore, it is now
important that individual employees and agents retain their own
counsel when any possibility exists of a violation of the FCPA under
the "knowing" standard. The repeal of the "Eckhardt Amendment"
may create a difficult working environment for employees or agents
and their employers or principals.
6. Enforcenent
The 1988 Amendments make four significant changes to the enforcement structure of the FCPA. First, the Justice Department has
been given civil injunctive and subpoena authority with respect to
97
violations by U.S. concerns.
Second, the Justice Department, after consultation with interested departments and the public, must determine within one year of
the enactment date of the 1988 Amendments the extent to which
'compliance with this section would be enhanced and the business
community" assisted by the issuance of guidelines for enforcement. 98 Thus, the 1988 Amendments effectively give the Attorney
General the discretion to determine whether any guidelines should
be issued. This amendment seems inconsistent with President
Carter's September 26, 1978, announcement that the Department of
Justice would "provide guidance" to the business community; however, the Department and the SEC did not respond enthusiastically. 99 This amendment does not meet the needs of the business
96 See H.R. REP. No. 640, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. at 11 (1977).
97 15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(d) (1988).
98 Id.

99 On September 26, 1978, President Carter announced that he was directing the
Department ofJustice to "provide guidance to the business community concerning its enforcement priorities under ihe recently enacted foreign anti-bribery statute." President's
Statement on United States Export Policy, 14 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1631, 1633 (Sept.

26, 1978). The Department ofJustice, however, responded negatively, asserting that, "all
they (businessmen) want to know is who they can bribe and who they can't. Well, we're
not going to tell them-we'll go down kicking and screaming on this one." Berry,Justiceis
Reluctant Guide on New Bribe Legislation, Wash. Post, Oct. 10, 1978,'at D7, col. 2. The Department ofJustice supported this view in hearings on S. 708, but added, however, that if
the law required guidelines; the Department ofJustice would issue them. SeeJoINT SENATE
HEARINGS, supra note 9, at 77-78 (statement of E.C. Schmults, Deputy Att'y Gen.); S. 708,
supra note 3, § 8 (providing for the issuance of guidelines by an interagency task force).
The Department ofJustice created the FCPA Review Procedure in March, 1980. The procedure has been criticized because it permits the Justice Department to use the information submitted by advice-seeking companies in the Department's subsequent prosecutions
for violations of the FCPA. See generally Surrey & Popkin, An Exercise in Non-Guidance: The
Foreign CorruptPractices Act Review Procedure, 3 MIDDLE EAST EXEC. REP. 3 (May, 1980). See

also GAO

REPORT,

supra note 7.

1990]

FOREIGN CORRUPT PRACTICES ACT

245

community or other departments of government for guidance. The
1988 Amendments seem to foreclose the possibility that any such
guidelines will be issued.
Third, the Justice Department is required to provide opinions
on the legality of actions for issuers or U.S. concerns that request
them within thirty days.' 0 0 A rebuttable presumption of conformance with the FCPA will exist if the Department issues a letter indicating that the conduct of the U.S. concern conformed with the
FCPA.' 0 ' This change essentially codifies a procedure used by the
Justice Department, but gives the Department only thirty days to act
and adds the "rebuttable presumption" language. The rebuttable
presumption may in fact lead to more requests under the Justice Department's Review Program, while providing another defense for potential violators.
Fourth, the 1988 Amendments create a new civil fine of
$10,000,102 and increase the maximum criminal fine for individuals

from $10,000 to $100,000.103 Criminal fines for U.S. corporations
10 4
are increased from $1 million to $2 million.
7. InternationalAgreement
Finally, the 1988 Amendments authorize the Piesident to negotiate an international agreement with the member countries of the
Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD)
to halt questionable payments to foreign officials.' 0 5 A newly added
section indicates that it is the intent of Congress that the President
should negotiate an agreement with the OECD. 10 6 The President is
required to submit a report to Congress on the progress of the negotiation and those steps that should be taken in the event that negotiations fail. 10 7 President Carter and the State Department were
rebuked at the United Nations when they attempted to negotiate
such an agreement. ' 0 8 The Reagan Administration pursued negotia10 9
tions at lower ministerial levels but was unsuccessful.
The 1988 Amendments ostensibly continue the past attempts to
put U.S. concerns at the bargaining table without a competitive disadvantage. This action seems unnecessary in light of the Graham
study which concludes that U.S. corporations are not placed at a
1oo

15 U.S.C. § 78dd-l(e)(1) (1988).
101 Id. As of 1986, only 18 companies submitted requests to the Justice Department
under the review procedure set up in 1980. See Longobardi, supra note 3, at 465.
102 15 U.S.C. § 78ff(c)(1)(B), (2)(C) (1988).
103 Id. § 78ff(c)(2)(A)-(B).
104 Id. § 78ff(c)(1)(A).
105 Pub. L. No. 100-418, § 5003d(l), (d)(2)(A), 102 Stat. 1424 (1988).
106 Id.
107 Id.
108 See Brennan, supra note 3, at 76-77.
109 Id.
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competitive disadvantage by the FCPA. t 10 One could also conclude
that if international negotiations fail, the President might recommend the repeal of the FCPA.
C.

Policy Implications

The 1988 Amendments make four significant changes to the antibribery section of the 1977 FCPA. First, they alter the definition of
"corrupt payments" and allow U.S. companies and issuers to make
extensive use of "grease" or facilitating payments never intended by
the 1977 Act. They send the wrong signals to the U.S. business community and to foreign officials; that is, it is acceptable to bribe if you
keep it "small." Second, they change the "reason to know" standard
for criminal liability to a "knowing" standard and define the latter in
such a way that prosecutors will find it difficult, if not impossible, to
prosecute violators of the FCPA. Third, two new affirmative defenses have been added for U.S. concerns thereby further enhancing
the environment for bribing foreign officials and making prosecution
of violations of the FCPA more difficult. Finally, the repeal of the
"Eckhardt Amendment" subjects middle-level managers to prosecution but exempts senior-level executives who can show they have no
knowledge of questionable payments. This change not only will create an adversarial environment within domestic concerns, but also
will require that employees involved in transactions abroad retain
their own counsel when there is the potential for a violation of the
FCPA.
IV.

Conclusion

The 1988 Amendments to the FCPA seek to redefine legally and
ethically acceptable conduct for U.S. concerns doing business in foreign nations. Those who espouse an efficiency view that the "right
to export" is best for the nation have succeeded in "gutting" the
FCPA after an eight-year struggle. In the meantime, those who have
been concerned about the legal and ethical conduct of U.S. companies doing business abroad have lost the battle to maintain the standards established by the 1977 FCPA. Scientifically sound studies (as
opposed to anecdotal comments) indicated that the 1977 FCPA was
at most a minor disincentive to export expansion, with other variables being far more important."' Moreover, the 1988 Amendments send the wrong signals to U.S. and foreign business
110 See Graham, supra note 85, at 93.
1 Id.; see Sternitzke, The Great American Competitive Disadvantage: Fact or Fiction, 10 J.
INT'L Bus. STUD. 25, 32-35 (1979). Sternitzke concludes that "over the last decade the
lagging long run growth of American exports has been due mainly to the loss of competitiveness of American manufacturing goods in affluent markets, and has been attributable
only incidentally to commodity structure or mix of American exports." See Graham, supra
note 85.
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communities at a time when new markets are opening in Eastern Europe. If we as a nation wish to encourage the adoption of an economic model based on competition for those who have experienced
the poverty of a command model, bribery, under the guise of "facilitating payments," we will only give ammunition to those in Eastern
Europe and elsewhere who are opposed to reform. While the proponents of the 1988 Amendments have won in the short run, a return
to pre-FCPA (1977) conduct by domestic concerns doing business
abroad will lead to more stringent legislation in the long term.

